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Abstract 
Considering that representative democracy has today ensured 
stratification at several levels, bolstered by economy as an ideology 
which maintains the dominating and the dominated in their rightful 
place, this paper intends to highlight a number of totalitarian 
tendencies, from a phenomenological perspective, that have revealed 
the limits and challenges of the power mechanisms of representative 
democracy. Contending that democracy is experienced and not simply 
a regime, we have highlighted the need for a critical attitude that 
deconstructs totalitarian discourses or narratives. 
Keywords: democracy; power; economic ideology; totalitarian 
phenomenology. 
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Por uma crítica fenomenológica da democracia 
representative 
    
Resumo 
Considerando que a democracia representativa tem assegurado,  
nos nossos dias, uma estratificação, exponenciada pela economía 
como ideologia, que mantém dominadores e dominados nos seus 
lugares próprios, procura-se evidenciar neste texto, numa perspetiva  
fenomenológica, algumas tendências totalitárias que revelam os 
limites e desafios dos mecanismos do poder da democracia 
representativa. Na defesa que a democracia é uma vivência e não 
apenas um regime, tenta-se sublinhar a necessidade de uma atitude 
crítica baseada numa reflexão capaz de desconstruir os discursos ou 
as narrativas totalitárias. 
Palavras  chave: democracia; poder;  ideologia económica; 
fenomenologia totalitária. 
 
Para una crítica fenomenológica de la democracia 
representativa 
 
Resumen 
Considerando que la democracia representativa se ha asegurado, 
en nuestros días, la estratificación, exponenciada por la economía 
como ideología, la cual mantiene dominadores y dominados en sus 
propios lugares, se busca poner de relieve en este texto, desde el 
punto de vista fenomenológico, algunas tendencias totalitarias que 
revelan los límites y desafíos de los mecanismos del poder de la 
democracia representativa. En la defensa de que la democracia es 
una experiencia y no sólo un régimen, se trata de subrayar la 
necesidad de una actitud crítica basada en la reflexión capaz de de 
construir los discursos o narrativas totalitarios. 
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If, conceptually, human beings’ rights and duties are equal, then 
democratic societies should be able to ensure this core evidence. If 
we (many among us) can see that the democratic regime has not 
evolved enough to improve this situation or even eliminate 
crystallized ways of keeping rudimentary power relations contrary 
to the universal concept of human being, in which some are 
enlightened and occupy management positions and others are 
doomed to settle for an apathy that reproduces unfamiliar models, 
perhaps we will find in this strategy one of the possible reasons 
why democracy, as a system, has not evolved as much as would be 
expected since it appeared. There are at least two reasons for this. 
The first reason is a problem of will and of maintaining a tight 
power structure, that is, if democracy opens the power to all 
citizens, by being stagnant it can maintain that privileged and 
atavistic power, under the disguise of democracy – based on the law 
of the strongest, on belonging to a certain case, or on other forms of 
legitimacy. The second reason somehow intersects with the first 
reason, in that it claims that man and humanity have not evolved. If 
man does not change, the modes of power remain unchanged and, 
in that sense, the concept of democracy is contrary to the ancestral 
nature of power
i
. 
Democracy is in crisis in the hearts and minds of man. The firm 
belief that equality of citizens before the law, as a conquest of the 
developed western world, is probably more of a rhetorical-legal-
political formalism than what is actually embraced in the 
experiences of human societies. Contemporary transformations are, 
therefore, presented uncritically shaped compared to values that in 
the past regarded political action as an ideal, because they did 
discriminate according to social class or economic wealth. In this 
context, all actions contrary to this assumption were considered 
unacceptable in a society that was meant to be fair and in which 
each man on its own claims his dignity and social and political 
rights.  
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Democracy seems to collapse before the many contaminations 
that distort it. As a people’s government system, whose 
phenomenology highlighted the importance of its majority will (and 
defined the principle of popular sovereignty), democracy does not 
really exist because it is not rooted in the anthropological and 
political realities of societies, even if it is recognized that as a 
phenomenon democracy is the expression of the will of the people
ii
: 
Ultimate power does not belong to any dynasty (…). It 
lives within the people or nation (as a community that 
transforms a people into a historical and political 
subject). This principle is crucial to break away with 
all archaic concepts, including those that  considered 
the “social contract” as an agreement between the 
people and the dynasty that governed them. The people 
(organized number of citizens), which is not to be 
confused with crowd (a chaotic number of 
individuals), are the genetic entity of all  political 
order. The people concentrate the demiurgic forces of 
construction,  reconstruction and reform of political 
regimes (Soromenho-Marques, 2014: 282- 283). 
   The concept of power in its relation with other concepts 
associated thereto, or those that have been associated to it due to 
historical, social and economic circumstances, still assumes that 
some human beings deserve to exert power over others (the 
majority)
iii
. It is under this disguise, and on the grounds of 
operational difficulties of a direct democracy, that the democratic 
regime based on representativeness is offered to us (with its known 
success). But the idea of representativeness can be fragile. First, 
because it is the reshaped heir of the monarchical/dynastic system: 
the king embodied the wishes of the nation and of the people; he 
was its legitimate representative. Second, because, as a 
phenomenon, representativeness is none other than the transfer of 
the subject to another subject who speaks on my behalf, who 
conveys my will, so that what I am can only be stated by mediation 
of the other
iv
. In this sense, each self is always hostage of what the 
other decides to do or defend. Being, through the other, can 
ontologically cancel out the self
v
. 
132                                                                        Paula Pereira y Fernando Bastos  
                                                       Opción, Año 32, No. 81 (2016): 129-145 
Representative democracy was often used as a bourgeois 
strategy to maintain and legitimize power, ensuring the same 
relations of dominance between classes and assuming that some are 
fit to decide while others are not. A full society is the one in which 
everyone is involved in politics, in which the same subjects decide 
on the issues that concern us. Incidentally, the idea behind this 
position is not to omit the difficulties behind a democracy exercised 
on a first-person perspective: 
Libertarians cannot accept power to be delegated to 
politicians. For them, this is abourgeois alienation. The 
revolutionary hope of emancipation of society 
allowing everyone to take part in decisions is very 
beautiful. But this vision of “bourgeois democracy”, 
giving way to a “democracy of councils”, where a 
large number of factory, neighborhood or school 
councils flourish, is utopian. Most people are not 
willing to enter into politics permanently, they would 
rather delegate and control. Consequently, this makes 
politics a profession (Cohn-Bendit, 1999, p. 26).  
If we do accept this position, however realistic it may seem to 
us, then not only will the totalitarian systems always be legitimized 
a priori, but also will all the concepts of perfect political and human 
stances be compromised. We create utopias based on the 
assumptions that the world can work in a better, fair and respectable 
way. There is one mobilizing feature of utopias that we cannot 
overlook, which in turn results from the non-conformist attitude of 
the utopian task. Although representative democracy is, indeed, a 
step forward, a transitory moment, it has also suffered from inertia 
because some men have used to continue to enforce despotic rule 
under the illusion of the best political system possible. 
Who should exercise power? Some will say that it is those who 
know how to! Those who have prepared themselves to wisely 
manage public matters! This Platonic sophocracy has come 
together with the even more exclusive and divisive view presented 
by Aristotle: not everyone can rule for the simple fact that, although 
we are all humans, some were born to rule and some to obey. We 
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can, therefore, almost anticipate what genetics today seeks to 
transmit: what we are, bio-psycho-socially is hostage to the 
information inscribed in everyone’s distinct genes. 
A natural slave is anyone who may belong to another 
(and this is the reason why it belongs to it) and also 
anyone who participates in the reasoning enough to 
learn without, however, having it; the animals different 
from man are not even capable of participating in the 
sensitive form of reason; they only obey passively to 
impressions. As to utility, slaves and animals are 
similar; they both help the body according to our 
 needs (Aristoteles, 1998, L. I, 1255a, p. 65).  
When we recognize, leniently and with a limitation of 
perfection, that the democratic regime is the best of imperfect 
systems, our reference is still the idealized principles, what should 
be, and not what conditions us as humans. These circumstances 
overcome our visions and our concrete situation in society
vi
.  
Consequently, by persuading us through idealizations that are 
meant to form a reality under construction, democracy subjects us 
to conditions which, in another context, would be seen as unworthy 
of man and often incompatible with the exercise of citizenship. This 
servile society, which is also promoted by democracy, is the 
consequence of the balance between what is perfect and what is 
imperfect, between the real and the utopian, between human 
imperfection and divine perfection.  
If we want to build a truly democratic society, if we want to 
overcome the theroretical and practical constraints of historical and 
philosophical assumptions of concepts it is not enough to critically 
dig up the past. Moreover, it is imperative that we address what we 
really want from a democratic society of the future, and of a future 
democratic society
vii
. The answer should be able to overcome the 
commitments, the individual interests, the pains. In other words, we 
should be able to think critically beyond … reasonably. One 
possible method is based on our ability to rationally deviate, of a 
learned ignorance that not only predisposes us to the real research, 
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but also puts us primarily in an epistemological position founded on 
a universal and, therefore, impartial rationality: 
The principles of justice are chosen from behind a veil 
of ignorance, ensuring that  no-one is helped or 
harmed the choice of those principles by the results of 
natural chance or by the contingency of social 
circumstances. (…) Given the circumstances of the 
original position, the symmetry of relations established 
between everyone, this initial situation puts the 
subjects, seen as moral entities, that is, as rational 
beings with their own purpose and (…) capable of a 
sense of justice, in an equal footing (Rawls, 2001: 34). 
If we are able to transpose Rawls’s ethical concept of justice, 
applied to politics, to an original position, we will ensure 
impartiality and universality of equity: “each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty with a similar liberty 
for others” (Idem, ibidem, p. 68). 
Our heritage – in particular the modern one – has sought to 
answer these questions through enlightened proposals that have 
regained the trust in a reason which had hitherto been sidelined. 
The ideals of the French Revolution or of the American Declaration 
of Independence showed the motivation to overcome the rigid 
power structure that belittled most citizens and ensured the status 
quo and perpetuation of a minority caste:  
Democracy does not rely on democratic institutions 
alone: it also depends on a rich  and complex civic 
and political life. Otherwise, votes lose their meaning, 
assemblies are  manipulated, politics focus on the 
parties’ staff, elites in power cease to be controlled. 
 In short, democracy has not reached its end or its 
finished formula. (…) We are not in a time of 
democratic endings, rather of beginnings (Morin, 
1988, p. 167). 
The right to freedom and dignity become universal ideals (or 
supposedly universal), equality being the foundation conditions of 
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being human. Everything seemed to be going in the right direction, 
but it wasn’t. The desire for power is one of the most intense 
instincts of living organisms. The history of power notes the 
attempts to satisfy that impulse as an incomplete teleology which 
are evident in behaviors, strategies and institutions. According to 
this history, two conditions and efforts collide: of power, as an 
attempt to expand endlessly, and of the individuals who react to that 
expansion (cf. Marina, 2009, p. 122)
viii
. 
Little by little this power instinct creeps in again and settles back 
in, reshaped, and immerses itself in apparently tolerable 
idiosyncrasies. In this sense, we believe that all political systems 
that in some way distort, in phenomenological terms, the relations 
of the concepts intrinsic to democracy conceal totalitarian 
intentions. More than their justified functionality, all indirect 
democracies aim to protect the difference between who should rule 
and who should submit to another’s ruling. Democracy can, 
therefore, be merely instrumental, in that it is used as a means to 
legitimize the impulse of domination
ix
.  
Power, participation, totalitarianism, globalization, flexibility, 
submission, dignity, utopia, minorities, crisis, public, private, 
freedom and democracy are some of the concepts closely related to 
the interests and directions of research on the systems of 
governance. However, because the mechanisms of power have 
always depended on context (cf. Nye, 2012, p.15), the salience, or 
not, of how each of these concepts is manifested in each historical 
period is not surprising. 
All the attempts to understand the phenomenon of political 
power can benefit more from the deconstructions and 
disagreements than from justifications of how power is expressed 
(where consensus is practically widespread). The essence of 
democracy does not reside in unanimous positions or in the lack of 
discussion. Quite the opposite, it lies in ideological confrontation
x
: 
A disagreement is not a quarrel about personal 
interests or opinions. It is a political  process that 
withstands legal disputes and opens a gap in the 
sensible order by  confronting the imposed 
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configurations of perception, of thought and of action 
with something “inadmissible”, i.e., with a political 
subject (Rancière, 2012: 91). 
The authentic democratic process opens gaps, even if this may 
cause insecurity and controversy, but it is precisely from that point 
that democracy becomes an experience rather than a mere regime, 
supported by the sense and action of philosophy. The democratic 
process is achieved by coordinating the political and philosophical 
projects. 
“Philosophy appears especially at times of 
abandonment (Hölderlin). During the thought 
experience, cognitive performance is not primarily at 
stake, rather the construction of knowledge by enriching 
our experience of the world, by the interest and 
provocation it raises. It means looking beyond whatever 
exists already, beyond what is there, beyond what we 
see and beyond what has already been thought, since 
thinking implies embracing a divide in our innermost 
self; a difference in relation to what we are and to what 
we know to affirm thought in articulation with the 
qualitative continuity of  wanting: the alternative to 
think in a different way, the alternative to devise and 
imagine in a different way, disrupting the logologies we 
have inherited and those still to come (Pereira, 
2011:98).  
  There were times when the political power outweighed 
economic and financial power, unlike today when the 
instrumentalization of power as a control mechanism has created 
osmosis between politics and the economy, the latter being more 
substantial
xi
.  This is why holding political and economic power 
is just a public show of a private power, almost secret, based on 
economic and financial surpluses that are distributed within a 
restricted group. In our time, economy has been uncovered as an 
ideology, as a resource strategy and as the implementation of the 
old feudal power, since in the political, ethical and civilizational 
spheres it is no longer justifiable.
 
The values of this new economic 
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liberalism – which imposes submission as a condition to a lesser 
evil, imposes fear (especially fear of the future) and takes hope 
away – are incompatible with the great values built and touted by 
western civilization. The dignity of the human being expressed in 
the safeguarding of isegoria (equal rights of speech), isonomy 
(political equality under the law) and isocracy (equal access to 
political positions). Against this antagonism, discourses continue to 
uphold those great values and, at the same time, practical and day-
to-day life is still hostage to the impositions that belittle working 
citizens. It did not take long for a strategy to justify this. By 
defining austerity and impoverishment as being a moral value, the 
idea was to suggest the morality behind such austerity and 
impoverishment to save the people and the world as we have 
always known it
xii
.  
This conveys an idea that the promotion of ruptures is immoral 
because we stand as obstacles to those who want to save us. By 
obeying and being blind to power and politics we are engaging in 
the salvation of society, as in the case of those who become poorer 
can increase their wealth.  
While to many of us, citizens of western democracies, slavery 
and exploitation of man by man are intolerable, evident feudalisms 
and democracies masked under the cloak of absolutism are 
nevertheless being relaunched. The absence of norms, stagnation, 
domestication, subjugation, impoverishment, democracy without 
Democracy are, therefore, the concepts that best define today’s 
society
xiii
. 
It might tentatively be said that the dignity and quality of life of 
men can be attacked if it is in any way an act of salvation, that is, if 
it guarantees the food of future humanity, or even of the hero 
generation, in the sense that we are told that the present generation 
must be inevitably sacrificed so that we can have a viable future. 
The idea behind this is that a savior generation becomes poorer and 
declines so that future generations can experience well-being. 
This strategy can be found in economic and political 
globalization processes. This economic imperative, transversal to 
all human activities, not only deceives the ontological status of 
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man, but also spreads the impression that it is the only means to 
save humanity. This idea of salvation of civilization has brought 
about a continuous instrumental dichotomy between lords and 
slaves, legitimizing the maintenance and exploitation of the latter as 
basic pillars of society, but nevertheless disposable because they are 
easily replaceable. 
Mark Blyth describes the concrete focus of these strategies:  
What begins as a banking crisis ends with a banking 
crisis, even if it goes through the  states’ accounts. But 
there is a politics of making it appear to be the states’ 
fault such that those who made the bust don’t have to 
pay for it. Austerity is not just the price of saving the 
banks. It is the price that the banks want someone else 
to pay” (Blyth, 2013: 24)xiv. 
We must not forget that the ideology of the schools of economic 
thought is biased and almost always compromised. These schools 
aim to legitimize political interests under the wing of (pseudo) 
economic scientificity. Their first objective is to make a profit (the 
more the better), and the second one, depending on how they stand 
in a formal democracy, is to legitimize those profits when the 
majority of the population lives on the threshold of survival.  
As Chrystia Freeland exposes: 
The age of mass production required a mass market – 
as Henry Ford put it, he needed  workers, including 
his own, to make enough money to buy his cars. 
For the plutocrats, globalization may be reducing 
both this political incentive and this  economic 
one to support inclusion. That’s because in today’s 
interconnected economy,  Western democracies 
can import economic demand from the emerging 
markets, and the  emerging markets can import 
democracy from the West. To put it another way, 
Western  businesses are less dependent on a 
prosperous domestic middle class because they can 
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 now sell to the rising middle class of the emerging 
markets (2014: 370). 
This is one of the signs of the times in which we live and which 
we need to learn how to read; the world is changing, what is 
common no longer belongs to men because being common implies 
that these very same men know what it is and the social purpose it 
aims to achieve. The end is no longer common, it is now limited to 
a teleonomical action in the hands of a group of techno-politicians 
or plutocrats.  
In this respect, the common no longer exists because it is no 
longer the lieu in which the wills of men come together and 
intercross with other wills, where the visibility of some no longer 
guarantees the building of a fair society. Consequently, or because 
of it, the effectiveness of public manifestations is internalized with 
skepticism; no changes in direction are expected nor renewed hopes 
in the future, just a constant individual atonement collectivized by 
fear, especially the fear of the future.  
The rhetoric of fear and danger has generated not only 
a “culture of fear” but also a “politics of fear”, that is, 
an anti-politics, since it erases politics so that it can 
exist. (…) Fear and danger are manufactured to justify 
abuses of power, uses of material and  symbolic 
violence, and discursive and material constructions of 
terror that, in turn,  promote the agenda of 
neoconservative authoritarianism. They seriously close 
the  universe of politics and shrink public spaces, 
ultimately resulting in the creation of an  anti-politics. 
(…) At the same time, fear and danger also legitimize 
and ratify measures, policies and practices that, 
ultimately, cater to the interests of a small group of the 
 privileged hegemonic class (Gounari, 2009: 54-58). 
 
In this context, we can see that the day after goes by as if the 
previous day had never existed; what happened was just the 
atonement of the tragedy experience by citizens, because the future 
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cannot be desired against a fear that is felt, internalized, where the 
uncritical acceptance of all changes people and their lives into a 
fatalist view of the future (cf. idem, ibidem, pp. 68-70).  
All the negative reality produced by the globalization 
of the markets, controlled by  the “liberalization of 
selfishness” confirms the need to claim the primacy of 
politics  (and ethics); the construction of a concept of 
politics based on a sympathetic rationality  that 
recovers and deepens the citizen’s protagonism and 
responsibility, insofar as  citizenship should be 
regarded as the political relationship between the 
individual and the community, that is, in that the 
human being assumes itself as a fully-fledged member 
of the community, participating in the various 
decision-making levels of life and political power 
(Pereira, 2012 p.12). 
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________ 
i.“Today, humanity lives in the 21st century with symbolic, mental and emotional structure 
that do not seem to have evolved. If one conclusion is to be drawn from previous research is 
that humanity does not evolve. As the human being is what it has always been, there is no 
reason for thinking that by relying on external support, in particular scientific and technical, 
he may one day become a Sweet and peaceful mammal, naturally driven by love of nature, by 
generosity, honesty or even rationality” (Farouki, 2005, p. 210). 
ii. “We must not forget that the democratic spirit of power is only executive, since the person 
behind the decisions is not he who works at the institutions that organize and maintain the 
democratic regime, but rather the people in their majority (for good and for bad). If this is not 
the case, and indeed this is what happens, it is because not even the democratic promise was 
able to, or did not want to be better than the formula of power that governs nature. For that  
reason, we should also reflecte, within political philosophy, on the nature of political power. 
The great problem of democracies does not really lie in their formal contents, but rather in 
the persistent background that dwells in our impulses” (Bastos, 2012, p. 252). 
iii.Reflections about power tend to focus on who exercises it. However, “power is an 
asymmetrical relation. Someone forces their will and someone else, for good and bad, obeys. 
What characterizes a relationship is that both sides are reciprocal. There is no father without a 
son, a subject without an object, or a buyer without a seller. In a relationship of power the 
subject imposes itself and the subject obeys. However, studies have often focused only on 
one of the sides of the relationship – he who has and executes the power –, so half of the 
phenomenon will be lost, namely how the subject is submitted. (…) When studying the forms 
and strategies of dominance, we need to study how the reigning subject and the subordinate 
subject are formed” (Marina, 2009, p. 43). It is therefore essential to characterize the aspects 
that define the dominated subject beyond the simplistic view of the dominating subject in 
order to understand the concept of power.  
iv.We should nevertheless avoid all forms of eulogy and promote a reason moved by the 
presence of the otherness, which replaces – going back to Levinas’s idea – “sovereignty with 
vulnerability that is reflected in the sensitivity needed to interrupt and question what is 
already established and, therefore, to break away from the sameness. Levinas recognizes, 
along with Kant, the subjection to the categorical imperative; but whereas in Kant the 
categorical imperative embraces the idea of an autonomous will, the origin of law, Levinas 
advocates the heteronomy of ethical obedience. The order is given by the face and not by 
force or coercion” (Pereira, 2011, pp.99-100). 
v.This psycho-political masochism is “a way to achieve that target. The different forms taken 
by masochistic impulses only have one target: dispose of the individual ego, lose itself; in 
other words, get rid of the burden of freedom. (…) The other is the attempt to become part of 
a larger and more powerful whole, extrinsic to the individual, and to submerge in and share 
it. (…) By becoming part of an unshakably stronger, eternal and fascinating power, the 
person participates in its glory and strength. It The person renounces to its self and to all 
pride and vigor associated thereto, loses its integrity as an individual, and gives up freedom, 
but nevertheless gains a new security and pride by taking part in the power in which it is now 
embedded” (Fromm, 1981, pp 126-128). 
vi.Idealization is, thus, a form of illusion. “We disguise our lust for power as wolves in the most 
easy to find sheep’s clothing. We hide the extent to which the exercise of power depends on a 
social and camouflaged limitation. We teach youngsters that in a democracy the power lies 
with the people and that in a market system all power is based on the sovereign consumer and 
on an impersonal offer and demand mechanism, without explaining that those truths only 
apply to “perfect democracy” situations or “perfect market”, which do not exist today. And, 
especially, we hide the fact that political power is founded on a necessary fiction that we all 
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want to forget that it is fiction, to reassure ourselves” (Marina, 2009, p.14), even if it is 
protective and mobilizing. 
vii.We must not forget that although power is based on an atavism structural to the human being, 
today it is distributed across the world in such a complex and diffuse way that in many cases 
the largest percentage of power is not in the hands of the states. The power of many non-state 
actors in certain areas, for e.g., information, is inexorably greater than most states. For this 
reason many of the states are learning to share power, or to empower others, so that together 
they can compete in this new paradigm of power: “in a world where borders are becoming 
more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations 
have to build international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and 
challenges. In this sense, power becomes a positive sum game. It is not enough to think in 
terms of power over other. One must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals that 
imply power with others. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us 
accomplish our own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important 
source of relevant power” (Nye, 2012, p. 17). 
viii.There is always an underlying tension between who wants to exercise power and the target 
thereof. “What teleology tells us is that this struggle between expansion and limitation does 
not seem to satify anyone. The powerful, because it forces him to be always on the alert and 
startled. The weak, because he feels out of the competition. To solve this natural discontent, 
intelligence plays a trick by inventing something that seems to please everyone: the 
legitimacy of power. (…) Secondly, because it also satisfies the subordinated, who used the 
legitimacy of power to be free from the oppression of illegitimate and purely factual powers. 
We must obey the legitimate powers and rebel against the illegitimate ones. This is a 
generally accepted dogma that forces all the power – whatever its origin – to quickly find 
some sort of legitimacy” (Marina, 2009, pp. 122-123). 
ix.“Animals act as far as their desires and strength allows them, while men have the desire to 
have more desires and strengths to satisfy them, which triggers a long and cruel history. (…) 
because a triumph gives us much pleasure, and in this anxious journey some people believe 
that the domination of others is the climax of affirmative dynamism. This is precisely where 
the direction of the impulse changes. Power ceases to be the expansion of one’s own energy 
to convert into the will to dominate” (Idem, ibidem, p. 20). 
x.Thus, today the search for possible consensus has more to do with strategies to impose these 
consensus aimed primarily at setting aside any objections, confrontation and disagreement, 
turning them into attitudes contrary to the democratic principles. Consensus and unanimity 
have been used as stereotypes of salvation of democratic societies, but we forget that 
accepting them passively is a recipe for ending democracy. “Democratic renewal will not be 
instigated by the drive for consensus but rather under the auspices of reasonable 
disagreement. Although democracy is impossible without a certain degree of consensus, it 
must nonetheless be open to the expression of diversity and to the articulation of collective 
identities rooted in different traditions. To declare that antagonisms of identity or ideological 
differences have been overcome indicates not wanting to take seriously the pluralism of 
values” (Innerarity, 2005, p. 128). 
xi.To the common citizen, the subordination of political power to economic power is so evident 
there is not a thinker today who does not contend “one of the most dramatic problems of 
contemporary societies, which has manifested as an indicator of the operational weakness of 
representative democracies, is the disorder and excess granted the economic and financial 
sphere over the last thirty years, as governments lowered their guard in relation to the 
financial system” (Soromenho-Marques, 2014, p. 314). This situation is gravely serious, 
placing not only today at risk. “No sustainable path can be followed in the European Union 
without a political consensus which is able to retake the primacy of politics, as the sphere of 
goals and liberty, putting economy and market in their rightful place, respectable and 
indispensable, but complementary” (Idem, ibidem, p. 317). 
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xii.This Judeo-Christian moral rationale has come to be more or less accepted passively, to 
impoverish to save, and has landed up today as the Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is 
the kingdom of heaven; Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth.  
xiii. “The idea of a single democracy is a void abstraction or an expression of the dangerous 
imperial utopia, founded on the dream of planetary empire governed by super-oligarchies, a 
race of supreme imposters celebrating the cult of Democracy, after having confiscated the 
name and interdicted real practice (…). The power of the people without power or people. An 
unthinkable Democracy without demos or kratos.” (Pierre-André Taguieff, 2002, Résister ao 
bougisme, in Baumier, 2007, pp. 45-46). 
xiv.Being absolutely crystal-clear, the strategy has locked the states and government under its 
thumb. The disproportionate importance, influence and consequences of banks is such that 
they became too big to fail and too big to bail. This means that the states became so hostage 
of the banks that they managed to get the status of impunity. The “reason why these ideas are 
so powerful is very material. It has to do with how a ‘too big to fail’ banking crisis in the 
United States became a ‘too big to bail’ banking crisis in Europe, and why this drives us all 
down the road to austerity” (Blyth, 2013, p. 11). 
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i
 “Today, humanity  l ives in the 21st century with symbolic , mental and emotional s tructu re that do not seem to have evolved. If one conclus ion is  to be drawn from previous research is  that humanity  does not evolve. As the human being is  what it has always been, there is  no reason for think ing that by rely ing on external support, in part icular sc ientific  and technical, he may one day become a Sweet and peaceful mammal, naturally  driven by love of nature, by generos ity, honesty or even rationality” (Farouki, 2005, p. 210). 
i i
 “We must not forget that the democratic  spirit of power is  only  executive, s ince the person behind the decis ions is  not he who works at the institutions that organize and maintain the democratic  regime, but rather the people in their majority  (for good and for bad). If this  is  not the case, and indeed this  is  what happe ns, it is  because not even the democratic  promise was able to, or did not want to be better than the formula of power that governs nature. For that reason, we should also reflecte, within political philosophy, on the nature of political power. The great problem of democrac ies does not really  lie in their formal contents, but rather in the pers is tent background that dwells  in our impulses” (Bastos, 2012, p. 252). 
i i i
 Reflections about power tend to focus on who exercises it. However, “power is  an asymmetrical relati on. Someone forces their wil l  and someone else, for good and bad, obeys. What characterizes a relationship is  that both s ides  are rec iprocal. There is  no father without a son, a subject without an object, or a buyer without a seller. In a relationship  of power the subject imposes itself and the subject obeys. However, s tudies have often focused only  on one of the s ides of the re lationship – he who has and executes the power –, so half of the phenomenon wil be lost, namely how the subject is  submitted. (…) When studying the forms and strategies of dominance, we need to s tudy how the reigning subject and the subordinate subject are formed” (Marina, 2009, p. 43). It is  therefore essential to characterize the aspects that 
define the dominated subject beyond the s implis tic  v iew of the dominating subject in order to understand the concept of power. 
iv
 We should nevertheless avoid all forms of eulogy and promote a reason moved by the presence of the otherness, which replaces – going back to Levinas’s  idea – “sovereignty  with vulnerabili ty  that is  reflected in the sensitiv ity  needed to interrupt and question what is  already established and, therefore, to break away from the sameness. Lev inas recognizes, along with Kant, the subjection to the categorical imperative; but whereas in Kant the categorical imperative embraces the idea of an autonomous wil l , the origin of law, Levinas advocates t he heteronomy  of ethical obedience. The order is  given by the face and not by force or coercion” (Pereira, 2011, pp.99 -100). 
 
v
 This  psycho-political masochism is  “a way to achieve that target. The different forms taken by masochis tic  impulses only  have one target:  dispose of the indiv idual ego, lose itself ; in other words, get rid of the burden of freedom . (…) The other is  the attempt to become part of a larger and more powerful whole, extrins ic  to the indiv idual, and to submerge in and share it. (…) By be coming part of an unshakably  s tronger, eternal and fascinating power, the person partic ipates in its  glory  and strength. It T he person renounces to its  self and to all pride and vigor associated thereto, loses its integrity  as an individual, and gives up f reedom, but nevertheless gains a new security  and pride by taking part in the power in which it is  now embedded” (Fromm, 1981 , pp 126-128). 
 
v i
 Idealization is , thus, a form of i l lus ion. “We disguise our lust for power as wolves in the most easy to find sheep’s c lothin g. We hide the extent to which the exerc ise of power depends on a soc ial and camouflaged l imitation. We teach youngsters that in a democracy the power l ies with the people and that in a market system all power is  based on the sovereign consumer  and on an impersonal offer and demand mechanism, without explaining that those truths only  apply  to “perfect democracy” s itua tions or “perfect market”, which do not exis t today. And, especially , we hide the fact that political power is  founded on a necessary fic tion that we al want to forget that it i s fic tion, to reassure ourselves” (Marina, 2009, p.14), even if i t is  protective and mobil iz ing. 
v i i
 We must not forget that although power is  based on an atav ism structural to the human being, today it is  dis tributed across t he world in such a complex and diffuse way that in many cases the largest percentage of power is  not in the hands o f the s tates. The power of many non-state actors in certain areas, for e.g., information, is  inexorably  greater than most s tates. For this  reason many of the s tates are learning to share power, or to empower others, so that together they can compete in thi s new paradigm of power: “in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations have to build international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and ch alenges. In this  sense, power becomes a positive sum game. It is  not enough to 
think in terms of power over other. One must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals  that imply  power with others. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us accomplish our own goals . In this  world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power” (Nye, 201 2, p. 17). 
v i i i
 There is  always an underlying tension between who wants to exerc ise power and the target thereof. “What teleology tells us is  that this  s truggle between expansion and l imitation does not seem to satify  anyone. The powerful, because it forces h im to be always on the alert and startled. The weak, because he feels  out of the competition. To solve this  natural disconten t, intelligence plays a trick  by inventing something that seems to please everyone: the legitimacy of power. (…) Secondly , because it also satis fies the subordinated, who used the legitimacy of power to be free from the oppress ion o f i l legitimate and purely  factual powers. We must obey the legitimate powers and rebel against the i legitimate ones. This  is  a generaly  accepted dogma th at forces all the power – whatever its  origin – to quickly  find some sort of 
legitimacy” (Marina, 2009, pp. 122-123). 
ix
 “Animals ac t as far as their des ires and strength allows them, while men have the desire to have more desires and strengths to satis fy  t hem, which triggers a long and cruel his tory. (…) because a triumph gives us much pleasure, and in this  anxious journey some people believe that the domination of others is  the c limax of affirmative dynamism. This  is  prec isely  where the direction of the imp ulse changes. Power ceases to be the expansion of one’s  own energy to convert into the wil to dominate” ( Idem, ibidem , p. 20). 
x
 Thus, today the search for poss ible consensus has more to do with s trategies to impose these consensus aimed primarily  at set ting as ide any objections, confrontation and disagreement, turning them into attitudes contrary to the democratic  princ iples.  Consensus and unanimity  have been used as s tereotypes of salvation of democratic  soc ieties, but we forget that accepting them pass ively  is  a rec ipe for ending democracy. “Democratic  renewal wil l  not be instigated by the drive for consensus but rather unde r the auspices of reasonable disagreement. Although democracy is  impossible without a certain degree of consensus, it must nonethel ess be open to the expression of divers ity  and to the articulation of collective identities rooted in different traditions. T o declare that antagonisms of identity  or ideological differences 
have been overcome indicates not wanting to take serious ly  the pluralism of values” (Innerarity , 2005, p. 128). 
x i
 To the common citizen, the subordination of political power to economic power is  s o evident there is  not a thinker today who does not contend “one of the most dramatic  problems of contemporary soc ieties, whi ch has manifested as an indicator of the operational weakness of representative democrac ies, is  the disorder and excess grant ed the economic and financial sphere over the last thirty  years, as governments lowered their guard in relation to the financial sys tem” (Soromenho-Marques, 2014, p. 314). This  s ituation is  gravely  serious, plac ing not only  today at risk . “No sustainable path ca n be folowed in the European Union without a political consensus which is  able to retake the primacy of politics , as the sph ere of goals  and l iberty , puting economy and market in their rightful place, respectable and indispensable, 
but complementary” (Idem, ibidem , p. 317). 
x i i
 This  Judeo-Chris tian moral rationale has come to be more or less accepted passively , to impoverish to save, and has landed up today as the Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs  is  the kingdom of heaven; Blessed are the meek, for they wil l  inherit the earth. 
x i i i
 “The idea of a single democracy is  a void abstraction or an express ion of the dangerous imperial utopia, founded on the dream  of planetary empire governed by super-oligarchies, a race of supreme imposters celebrating the cu l t of Democracy, after hav ing confiscated the name and interdic ted real practice (…). The power of the people without power o r people. An unthinkable Democracy without demos  or kratos.” (Pierre-André Taguieff, 2002, Résister ao bougisme, in Baumier, 2007, pp. 45-46). 
x iv
 Being absolutely  crystal -clear, the s trategy has locked the s tates and government under its  thumb. The disproportionate importance, influence and cons equences of banks is  such that they became too big to fail and too big to bail. This  means that the s tates became so hostage of the banks that they managed to get the s tatus of impunity . The “reason why these ideas ar e so powerful is  very material. It has to do with how a ‘too big to fail ’ banking crisis  in the United States became a ‘too b ig to bail ’  banking cris is  in Europe, and why this  drives us all down the road to austerity” (Bly th, 2013, p. 11). 
 
